Political Recognition vs. Legal Statehood: Palestine, Kosovo, and the Vatican in International Law

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed a resolution on September 12, 2025, by a margin of 142 in favor, 10 against, and 12 abstentions. The resolution condemned the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks, called for the release of hostages, and urged the establishment of a Palestinian state “without Hamas” through irreversible steps toward a two-state solution. The measure was non-binding. As such, it carries political weight but no legal force under international law. Israel rejected the resolution outright, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu calling it “a reward for Hamas.” The United States stood firm in opposition.

The passage of this resolution highlights a long-standing tension in global politics: the difference between political recognition and legal statehood.

  • Palestine is recognized as a sovereign state by more than 130 countries.
  • Kosovo is recognized by around 100.
  • The Vatican (Holy See) is recognized by virtually every state.

Yet their legal status within the United Nations differs. The Vatican and Palestine share “non-member observer state” status. Kosovo remains outside the UN altogether. The crucial difference lies not in meeting abstract criteria for statehood but in the geopolitics of UN Security Council veto power.

This article explores the legal and political dimensions of the UN resolution on Palestine. It draws comparisons with Kosovo and Vatican City. It situates the debate in international law, traces relevant historical events, and demonstrates why non-binding resolutions do not fundamentally alter legal realities.

The Legal Framework of Statehood

What exactly does it take for a country to be legally recognized? The answer is not as straightforward as it might appear. International law provides one set of criteria, while the United Nations enforces another. The result is a gap between entities that satisfy the legal definition of statehood and those that achieve political acceptance on the world stage.

The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), signed at the Seventh International Conference of American States in Uruguay, was one of the first systematic efforts to codify the requirements of statehood. Although it was a regional treaty limited to the Americas, its four-part test became foundational to modern international legal thought. Article 1 of the convention specifies that a state must possess:

  1. 1. A permanent population
  2. 2. A defined territory
  3. 3. A government
  4. 4. The capacity to enter into relations with other states

The importance of the Montevideo Convention lies in its adoption of the declaratory theory of statehood. Under this theory, an entity qualifies as a state if it objectively meets these conditions, regardless of whether other states recognize it. This framework established a legal baseline for treating statehood as a matter of law rather than political discretion.

Although the Montevideo Convention is not binding outside its signatories and has never been formally adopted by the United Nations, its four criteria have become widely accepted as customary international law. Courts, governments, and scholars continue to cite Montevideo as the baseline test for statehood. For that reason, it remains the “starting point” in legal discussions of sovereignty, even though political recognition frequently overrides its application in practice.

Montevideo offers a clear legal definition of statehood. The United Nations, however, has become the decisive authority in practice on who is accepted as a sovereign nation. Article 4 of the UN Charter (1945) sets the framework for admission, but it functions less as a legal test and more as a procedural and political filter. Article 4 states:

“Membership in the United Nations is open to all peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.”

In practice, Article 4 establishes a multi-step process:

  • A state must apply for membership.
  • The application must win at least nine affirmative votes in the Security Council.
  • None of the five permanent members (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China) may cast a veto.
  • If recommended by the Council, the application then goes to the General Assembly, where a two-thirds majority is required for admission.

Unlike Montevideo, Article 4 does not set out objective conditions such as population, territory, or government. Its language is deliberately broad, leaving discretion to existing UN members and, most significantly, to the five permanent members of the Security Council. This structure ensures that UN membership depends as much on political acceptance as on legal qualifications.

The interaction between Montevideo and Article 4 reveals the enduring gap between law and politics in international relations. Montevideo provides the legal criteria for statehood. Article 4 supplies the political gatekeeping that determines whether those criteria matter in practice. Entities such as Palestine and Kosovo can meet the Montevideo test but remain excluded from the UN because of Security Council vetoes. Israel in 1949 illustrates the opposite: despite unsettled borders, it gained admission because it had the support of the great powers.

In the modern era, the United Nations serves as the de facto global benchmark for statehood. Even overwhelming General Assembly support, such as the September 2025 vote on Palestinian statehood, cannot secure full membership if a single permanent member of the Security Council objects. The Montevideo Convention continues to define the legal baseline, but Article 4 guarantees that political realities outweigh legal theory in determining who is accepted as a state in the international order.

Palestine: Political Recognition vs Legal Deadlock

International Recognition

Palestine declared statehood in 1988, and since then more than 130 UN member states, primarily in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, have recognized it as a sovereign nation. On paper, that places Palestine ahead of Kosovo, which has fewer than 100 recognitions, and makes it one of the most widely recognized states outside the United Nations system. In 2012, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 67/19, upgrading Palestine to the status of a non-member observer state, the same position held by the Vatican. Non-member status can be conferred by the General Assembly without Security Council approval.

This was not a symbolic gesture. The upgrade gave Palestine access to international organizations such as the International Criminal Court and allowed it to sign and ratify treaties, enabling it to act as a state in parts of the international legal order. Despite these gains, Palestine remains unable to cast votes in the General Assembly or secure a seat on the Security Council. Its position is one of partial legitimacy: a state in the eyes of much of the world, but without full legal standing in the institution that matters most.

Security Council Vetoes

The barrier to Palestine’s full membership is not recognition numbers, but Security Council politics. Palestine has repeatedly secured the support of a majority of the Council’s rotating members, often more than the nine affirmative votes required under Article 4 of the UN Charter. The United States has consistently exercised or threatened its veto, citing unresolved borders, the role of Hamas in Gaza, and the claim that Palestinian statehood must emerge from direct negotiations with Israel. The U.S. veto in April 2024 of a draft resolution recommending Palestine’s admission is the most recent example of this entrenched policy. In practice, the U.S. position ensures that no matter how many states recognize Palestine, its UN status will not advance without a shift in Washington’s stance.

The Role of Disputed Borders

The most prominent legal argument used to justify blocking Palestine’s membership is the claim that its borders are unresolved. Israel occupies East Jerusalem, controls large portions of the West Bank, and maintains a blockade on Gaza, which remains under Hamas’s de facto control. The General Assembly has treated these issues as temporary, allowing Palestine to advance within the UN system as far as observer status. The Security Council, dominated by permanent member veto power, has treated them as disqualifying. The double standard is evident when compared to Israel’s admission in 1949. At that time, Israel also had contested and unsettled borders, fresh from the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Unlike Palestine today, however, Israel enjoyed the support of both the United States and the Soviet Union, and that political backing outweighed the lack of territorial clarity. Palestine, despite broader international recognition, lacks the decisive support of a single great power and remains locked out of membership.

Practical Consequences of Observer Status

Being confined to observer status has real-world consequences for Palestine. It can sign treaties and join institutions such as the ICC, but it lacks the ability to vote in the General Assembly or influence the selection of Security Council members. It cannot block or shape resolutions that affect its interests. Palestine also faces restrictions in international finance and trade, since many global institutions take their cue from the UN when determining which entities are treated as sovereign states. Bilateral recognition gives it embassies, flag status, and some treaty access, but without UN membership it cannot fully participate in the international order. This limited status also weakens its negotiating power with Israel and leaves it reliant on external allies to push its case in global forums. In short, observer status allows Palestine to act like a state in some respects while underscoring its exclusion from the highest levels of international decision-making.

Israel’s Admission and the Contrast with Palestine

Israel declared independence in May 1948, following the expiration of the British Mandate for Palestine and the adoption of the UN Partition Plan of 1947. The new state was immediately drawn into war with neighboring Arab countries, and its borders remained unsettled during and after the conflict. Despite these conditions, Israel received rapid recognition from both the United States and the Soviet Union, two powers that were otherwise bitter rivals in the early Cold War. That unusual convergence of support was decisive.

In May 1949, Israel was admitted to the United Nations by General Assembly Resolution 273, which followed a Security Council recommendation. The decision acknowledged that Israel had accepted the obligations of the UN Charter, and it reflected the political reality that a majority of member states supported its admission. At the time, questions about borders and refugees were noted, but they were not treated as disqualifying, in part because the geopolitical interests of the great powers aligned in favor of Israel’s inclusion.

The contrast with Palestine is significant but should be understood in this historical context. Palestine’s unresolved borders are cited today as the central obstacle to its membership. Yet the decisive factor is not the borders themselves, but the political stance of the United States, which has consistently used its Security Council veto to block Palestinian admission. The comparison demonstrates that the UN’s gatekeeping has always been shaped less by strict legal standards and more by the political calculations of the Security Council’s permanent members.

Vatican City: A State Without UN Membership

Vatican City offers a unique counterpoint in discussions of statehood. Its creation was the product of the Lateran Treaty of 1929, signed between the Holy See and the Kingdom of Italy under Benito Mussolini. The treaty resolved the so-called “Roman Question,” a political and territorial dispute that had lingered since Italian unification in 1870. When Italy annexed the Papal States, the Popes lost control of their temporal territories and considered themselves “prisoners in the Vatican.” For nearly sixty years, relations between the Italian state and the Papacy remained frozen.

The Lateran Treaty ended that deadlock by establishing Vatican City as a new, independent sovereign state under the exclusive authority of the Holy See. Italy formally recognized papal sovereignty over the 0.2 square miles within Rome that make up the Vatican, and the Holy See in turn recognized the Kingdom of Italy and its capital in Rome. Vatican City remains the only country in the world to have been created through this treaty framework, making it a singular case in modern state formation.

Despite its tiny size, Vatican City meets the traditional Montevideo criteria for statehood:

  • A defined and undisputed territory (0.2 square miles within Rome)
  • A permanent, albeit small, population
  • A functioning government (the Pope and the Roman Curia)
  • Capacity for foreign relations (over 180 diplomatic missions)

The Holy See chose not to pursue full UN membership after the organization’s creation in 1945. Instead, in 1964, it accepted the status of permanent observer state. This position allows it to participate in General Assembly debates and maintain diplomatic relations without becoming entangled in the political alliances and voting blocs of the UN. The choice reflects the Vatican’s preference for neutrality and independence in global affairs.

The Vatican’s case demonstrates that full UN membership is not required for a state to be sovereign, universally recognized, and fully functional in international law. It is an example of how a state can exercise international influence and maintain legitimacy through bilateral diplomacy and treaty participation while remaining outside the UN framework.

Kosovo: Recognition Without UN Membership

Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008. It meets the Montevideo criteria for statehood and has been recognized by around 100 UN member states, including most European Union countries and the United States. Despite this recognition, Kosovo is not a member of the United Nations. Russia and China, both permanent members of the Security Council and allies of Serbia, oppose its membership and have used their veto power to block admission.

Kosovo’s position illustrates the mirror image of Palestine’s situation. Palestine is recognized by much of the Global South but blocked from UN membership by the United States. Kosovo is recognized by much of the West but blocked by Russia and China. Both entities function as states in political and practical terms, yet both remain legally constrained by the geopolitics of the Security Council.

The 2025 Non-Binding Resolution: What It Means

In September 2025, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution by a wide margin, 142 votes in favor, 10 against, and 12 abstentions. The measure condemned the October 7 Hamas attacks, called for the release of hostages, and endorsed the establishment of a Palestinian state without Hamas. On the surface, this outcome looked like a major diplomatic victory for Palestine, with overwhelming international support. Yet because the resolution was non-binding, it carried only symbolic force.

The resolution is politically significant:

  • It demonstrates overwhelming global support for Palestinian statehood.
  • It condemns Hamas and strengthens calls for hostages to be released.
  • It places pressure on Israel and the United States, highlighting their isolation on the issue.

The resolution changes nothing legally:

  • Non-binding resolutions cannot override the UN Charter’s rules for membership.
  • Security Council veto power remains decisive.
  • Disputed borders and the Hamas factor continue to provide justification for U.S. opposition.

The September 2025 resolution is best understood as a signal rather than a solution. It reinforced the extent of global backing for Palestinian aspirations but left the core obstacle untouched: the Security Council’s gatekeeping power. Unless the United States alters its stance, Palestine will remain trapped in observer status no matter how many countries vote in favor at the General Assembly.

The UN’s September 2025 non-binding resolution on Palestine highlights the enduring divide between political recognition and legal statehood. More than 130 countries treat Palestine as a state, yet without Security Council approval and full UN membership it remains in limbo. Kosovo shares a similar fate, functioning as a state without UN membership because of Russian and Chinese opposition. The Vatican demonstrates the reverse, proving that a state can exist fully without UN membership when it is universally recognized and deliberately chooses not to join.

This comparison underscores a larger truth. Statehood in practice is determined less by legal doctrine and more by power politics. The Montevideo Convention provides the theoretical baseline for what a state is. Article 4 of the UN Charter ensures that the decisive test is political, resting on the judgment of existing members and the veto power of the permanent five. Israel’s admission in 1949 despite disputed borders illustrates the point. What matters most is recognition by powerful states, not legal neatness.

The 2025 resolution is therefore politically powerful but legally hollow. It demonstrates a global consensus on Palestinian statehood in principle, yet confirms that as long as the U.S. veto remains in place, Palestine’s legal status will remain contested. The question that opened this discussion, what it takes for a country to be legally recognized, finds its answer here. Law sets the conditions, but politics decides the outcome. In the international system, sovereignty is never only a matter of law. It