The events of this weekend reflect a growing crisis in the way Americans interpret constitutional authority and engage with matters of war and governance.
I had intended to spend today examining the President’s recent decision to authorize military strikes against Iran, and to assess both the immediate and long-term geopolitical ramifications of that action, particularly in light of Iranian counterstrikes on U.S. bases in Qatar and Iraq on Monday, 23 June 2025. However, the national discourse has once again shifted. As public attention has moved from immigration and ICE operations to renewed conflict in the Middle East, a wave of commentary has emerged from individuals who are either inexperienced, perhaps unqualified, or inappropriately financially motivated to be asserting expertise in constitutional law and military doctrine.
Critics among the Democrats argue the President violated constitutional requirements by failing to consult Congress prior to authorizing the strike, asserting that he must obtain legislative approval before engaging in acts of war. Republican defenders, by contrast, contend that the President, as Commander in Chief, possesses inherent authority to initiate military action without congressional authorization.
Although the arguments advanced by Democrats and Republicans differ in tone and content, both reflect significant misreadings of constitutional limits and executive authority. It is a rare moment when both sides are wrong for entirely different reasons. Meanwhile, bipartisan consensus on a far more basic issue (and more important to the domestic constituency) in the form of passing a balanced federal budget remains an alarmingly elusive achievement.
The argument that the President must obtain congressional approval prior to engaging in a war is, at its core, procedurally accurate; however, this view reflects a narrow understanding of how executive/legislative dynamics operate in practice. The claim is comparable to insisting that the President must wait for Congress to pass a budget before he is permitted to respond through either a signature or a veto, when in reality his role is reactive and only begins once the proposal reaches his desk.
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power "to declare war," and it is on these three words that many Democratic objections rest. The provision establishes a formal check on executive power, though it also creates a peculiar dilemma: just as the President cannot initiate war without congressional authorization, he may also be compelled to wage war if Congress declares it unilaterally. This tension reflects one of the many constitutional ambiguities left to us by the Founding Fathers, an architectural flaw easier to distinguish when a lifetime has been spent studying the nuisance of constitutional law.
Republican defenders, including some elected officials and political commentators, argue that the Constitution grants the President authority to initiate military action without congressional consultation. This interpretation hinges on Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, which states: “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy…” That clause has since been understood to include all branches of the armed forces. However, asserting that the Constitution explicitly authorizes unilateral presidential war-making requires more than rhetorical confidence; it requires constitutional grounding. As Justice Jackson observed in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952):
“These cryptic words have given rise to some of the most persistent controversies in our constitutional history. Of course, they imply something more than an empty title. But just what authority goes with the name has plagued Presidential advisers who would not waive or narrow it by nonassertion yet cannot say where it begins or ends. It undoubtedly puts the Nation’s armed forces under presidential command. Hence, this loose appellation is sometimes advanced as support for any Presidential action, internal or external, involving use of force, the idea being that it vests power to do anything, anywhere, that can be done with an army or navy.”
In a 6–3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled against the President’s authority to seize and operate the steel mills, despite the administration’s argument that the action was necessary to prevent a labor strike during the Korean War.
The Constitution, while foundational, is not the controlling legal framework at the core of this discussion. The more relevant authority is the War Powers Resolution of 1973, more commonly known as the War Powers Act. This law is filled with language that lacks nuance and definition, making it nearly as difficult to interpret as the phrase 'well regulated militia' in the Second Amendment, though arguably even more consequential in practice.
The two key things about the War Powers Act centers around these two quotes:
Section 3 of the law states:
“The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities.”
Section 4(a)(1) requires that:
“Within 48 hours after introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, the President shall submit a report to the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate…”
The core issue lies in a single word: shall. Originally intended as a substitute for will, the word has become so ambiguous in federal law that Congress passed the Plain Writing Act in 2010 (Public Law 111-274), which requires executive agencies to use language the public can clearly understand and apply.
Notably, the Act itself did not define shall or must. Instead, the following year, the Plain Language Action and Information Network (PLAIN) released non-binding federal guidelines recommending the following:
- Use must to indicate requirements
- Use must not to indicate prohibitions
- Avoid using shall
These guidelines, though advisory, make a compelling case for codifying this distinction into law.
If the Democrats wanted to make an argument for the President not following the law, they should focus on the War Powers Act. Still, the phrase “in every possible instance shall” is fraught with ambiguity. What is a possible instance? What is an impossible instance? All because of one word: shall.
Republican advocates would likely argue, with justification, that informing all 535 members of Congress increases the risk of operational leaks that could endanger pilots and military assets. The law does not explicitly "require" prior consultation, in part because the term shall has been used inconsistently in legal writing, variably meaning must, should, may, or will depending on the context. In the coming weeks, public discourse will likely descend into familiar partisan exchanges. Democrats will accuse former President Trump of warmongering, while Republicans will respond by pointing to similar actions taken by Democratic administrations. These rhetorical exchanges, however impassioned, often obscure the broader constitutional and legal issues at hand.
Since 1973 we have had the following presidents: Nixon, Ford, Carter, Regan, H.W. Bush, Clinton, W. Bush, Obama, Trump and Biden.
Since 1973 the Presidents who have authorized actions under the War Powers Act are:
- Ford (Cambodia)
- Regan (Grenada, El Salvador, Lebanon)
- H.W. Bush (Panama, Iraq)
- Clinton (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Sudan)
- Obama (Libya)
- Trump (Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, Iran)
- Biden (Syria, Somalia, Sudan)
This leaves Nixon (who was leaving office), Carter (who preferred to rely on diplomacy), and George W. Bush (who operated primarily under the broad authorization of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force [AUMF]) as the only three Presidents who have not invoked the War Powers Act.
To bypass the inevitable partisan arguments, whether one side claims hypocrisy or the other deflects blame, it is worth remembering that the President, regardless of political affiliation, represents the entire nation. The consequences of his decisions, particularly in matters of war, are borne collectively by the American people.
Rather than continuing the partisan debate, a more productive approach would be to amend the Plain Writing Act with the following clarifications:
Federal laws and executive guidelines must adopt consistent terminology: - Use must to indicate requirements. - Use must not to indicate prohibitions. - Terms such as shall, should, and will would be classified as optional and advisory, not legally binding
Upon adoption of these clarifications, the next logical step would be to amend the War Powers Act itself:
Section 3 “The President should, when possible, consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities. When this is not possible the President must brief the gang of eight prior to engaging in hostilities.”
Section 4(a)(1) “Within 48 hours after introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, the President must submit a report to the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate…”
By making these 38-word revisions, we take a critical step toward reducing legal ambiguity and ending the recurring partisan disputes over presidential war powers, especially given that all but three modern Presidents have invoked the War Powers Act.
For those curious about my perspective, it is grounded in formal academic training and practical service. I hold degrees in Political Science and History, with extensive study of the Constitution. Additionally, I am a retired Captain who served in the United States Air Force, an institution that taught me, with precision and clarity, the operational difference between shall, should, will, and must.